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I. Introduction 
 
What purpose is served by a government’s protection of religious liberty, such as 
that observed in the United States Constitution?  Many have been suggested, the most 
prominent of which center on the protection of freedom of belief and expression.  While 
it is clear that the guarantee of religious freedom does serve these purposes, they are such 
demanding goals that they could put an end to virtually all regulation.  Every regulation 
potentially interferes with religious freedom – e.g., a requirement to pay taxes interferes 
with someone’s belief that the payment of tax is a sin.1  In light of this, it is useful to 
consider more concrete purposes that could suggest limits on the degree to which 
religious liberty should be protected.2 
 
This paper focuses on the concrete economic consequences of state regulation of 
religion.  Specifically, we examine the effects of state regulation on corruption, growth, 
and inequality.  The results suggest that laws and practices burdening religion enhance 
corruption.  Laws and practices subsidizing religion, however, do not appear to enhance 
corruption.  Laws burdening religion reduce economic growth.  Laws subsidizing religion 
and practices either burdening or subsidizing religion do not appear to affect growth.  
Laws burdening religion are positively associated with inequality.  Practices burdening 
religion and laws subsidizing religion appear to have no significant impact on inequality. 
There is weak evidence that practices subsidizing religion may reduce inequality. 
 
These results have several implications.  First, the positive association between 
corruption and laws burdening religion provides empirical confirmation of one part of 
Adam Smith’s analysis of religions in The Wealth of Nations.  Under Smith’s analysis, 
state regulation of religion would produce corruption as rulers sought to tax and prohibit 
churches that failed to support them.  The finding that laws burdening religion harm 
economic growth suggests that the corruptive effect is economically significant.  Lastly, 
while the inequality findings are inconsistent with a Marxian view of state religious 
regulation, they are not inconsistent with the rent-seeking theory. 
 
As we explain below, Smith’s corruption analysis was largely repeated in a 
pamphlet by James Madison that has become one of the key writings used to understand 
the purpose of the United States Constitution’s protection of religious liberty.  The 
empirical results in this paper provide support to Madison’s theory of the purpose of a 
state guarantee of religious liberty.  This view is more limited than the “freedom of 
expression” theory that has dominated public discourse.  Examining the theory and 
evidence behind the corruption argument suggests a clearer picture of the precise limits 
on government regulation suggested by Smith and probably intended by Madison.  It also 
                                                 
1 Friedman (1962, p.8-9) recounts the case of the Amish sect that refused on religious principle to pay for 
or accept social security benefits. 
2 McConnell and Posner (1989), at 6, also take as a starting point of their analysis the notion that every law 
could potentially interfere with religious freedom.  However, their approach is to use economics to 
constrain the definition of interference, and much of the non-economic literature has tried to use some 
theory to constrain the notion of interference.  Our approach is different; we make no effort here to 
constrain the notion of interference. 
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has implications for current policy issues, such as school vouchers and the subsidization 
of religious institutions. 
 
II. The Policy Debate in America 
 
The optimal relationship between the state and religion has been a controversial 
issue in the United States since its birth.  The U.S. Constitution contains a guarantee of 
religious liberty in the First Amendment: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
 
The dominant views of the original purpose of the First Amendment have been 
attributed to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  Madison’s views were set out in his 
open letter titled “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785.”3  
The letter was published in opposition to a bill before the Virginia colonial legislature 
that would have required citizens to pay a tax to support Christian sects in Virginia. 
 
Madison saw the bill as a breach of the “great Barrier which defends the rights of 
the people,”4 by forcing citizens to contribute money to churches that they might not 
otherwise wish to support.  The negative consequences Madison identified were harm to 
the state and harm to the subsidized churches.  The state would be harmed because the 
expanded governmental authority recognized by the bill would eventually be abused.  In 
addition, the subsidized churches would use their newfound influence and power, fed 
through forced contributions, to seek further restrictions on the liberty of citizens. 
 
Religion would be harmed, according to Madison, because the subsidized 
churches would become unresponsive to the needs of congregants, secure in the 
knowledge that their funding would be guaranteed by government’s strong hand.  
Madison noted that the historical experience of ecclesiastical establishments had been 
“pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, 
superstition, bigotry, and persecution.”5 
 
Although Jefferson was the author of a bill establishing religious freedom 
(enacted in the wake of the defeat of the subsidization bill attacked by Madison), he never 
took the time to carefully set out his views on the proper relation between church and 
state.  The most important statement from Jefferson comes from a letter he wrote to the 
Danbury Baptist Association in 1802.  In the letter, Jefferson referred to the First 
Amendment as “building a wall of separation between Church and State.”6 
                                                 
3 See Padover (1953), at 299-306. 
4 Id. at 300. 
5 Padover (1953), at 302. 
6 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), in Lipscomb and Bergh 
(1903), at 281-282. 
 4
 
Jefferson’s wall metaphor seems to paraphrase Madison’s reference to the “Great 
Barrier” in his Memorial and Remonstrance.  However, the two metaphors represent very 
different images.  Madison never referred to a barrier between church and state; he 
argued that the Virginia church subsidization bill breached a hypothetical barrier between 
government’s power and individual rights.  Madison’s concern was that the subsidization 
bill authorized the Virginia colonial government to assume powers that would have been 
equally threatening to individual rights even if the bill had nothing to do with religion.  
Religion, being more central to personality and important as a motivator of action than 
other belief systems, simply made the potential harm greater and more probable. 
 
These two notions of the First Amendment’s purpose; one of a rigid barrier 
preventing the state from doing anything that substantially affects religion, and the other 
of a more ambiguous set of constraints designed to avoid specific harms likely to result 
from government taxation, subsidization, or regulation of religion; summarize the 
opposing views that have influenced courts and legislatures over the years.  Modern first 
amendment case law largely reflects the more restrictive view of Jefferson.  However, the 
Supreme Court’s school voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,7 represents a shift 
toward Madison’s view with its conclusion that taxpayer-financed vouchers could be 
given to students attending religious schools without violating the First Amendment. 
 
In spite of the success of the view attributed to Jefferson, Madison’s argument 
remains the most careful explanation of the First Amendment’s purpose by one of its 
framers.  However, Madison’s letter was not designed as a policy analysis, and contains 
arguments that would be considered inappropriate for policy analysis today (e.g., on the 
validity of Christian beliefs).  And Madison was not writing on a clean slate.  The 
economics of religion had been explored in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, 
published eight years before Madison’s letter.  Madison’s argument appears to be based 
on Smith.  In order to explore the policy basis for a rule protecting religious freedom (i.e., 
restricting government regulation of religion), we look directly at the economic literature 
next.  
 
III. Economics of Religion 
 
There earliest economic treatments of religion were by Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx.  The Marxian treatment of religion is better known.  However, if James Madison’s 
views had been shaped in part by reading Smith, which is plausible given the publication 
date of The Wealth of Nations, Smith’s treatment would have to be regarded as far more 
influential. 
 
A. From Adam Smith to the Modern Literature 
 
As we noted before, a large part of Smith’s analysis is described in Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance, though in summary form.  Smith treated religions as if they 
were firms selling a product to customers.  Entry of new religious firms would occur in 
                                                 
7 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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order to meet consumer demand.  The creation of monopoly power through government 
licensing, or the establishment of a state religion, would diminish the religious seller’s 
effort to meet consumer tastes.  Over time, the clergy of a state-supported church would 
become distant from the concerns of the church members.  State support creates a lazy 
monopoly (Seidler, 1979; Hirschman, 1971).  Smith described that as the experience of 
state-supported churches. 
 
A competitive market in religions would allow new churches to continually enter 
in order to meet the needs of customers.  The threat of new churches entering would force 
established churches to remain in touch with the desires of their members and to charge 
competitive prices for religious services. 
 
More provocatively, Smith argued that a competitive market in religions would 
reduce religious-based strife. 
 
The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and 
troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in society, or 
where the whole of society is divided into two or three great sects… But 
that zeal must be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two 
or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which 
no one could be considerable enough to disturb publick tranquility.  The 
teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more 
adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and 
moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those 
great sects, whose tenets being supported by the civil magistrate, are held 
in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and 
empires,…(Smith, p. 793) 
   
Smith envisioned competition among sects eventually yielding a “pure and rational 
religion,” free from absurdity and fanaticism.  Thus, the threat of losing members to new 
religions would make religious teachers more tolerant of other religions and produce 
better religious doctrine. 
 
Since the mid-1970s, the economics literature has begun to explore religion – 200 
years after Smith’s book.  The literature has focused on four topics: the industrial 
organization of religions, control of free-riders, human capital and time allocation, and, 
more recently, the effects of religion on economic growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003).   
The first topic, industrial organization, follows Smith’s earlier contributions with 
empirical studies largely confirming his predictions (e.g., monopoly religions effects, 
religious diversity and attachment) (Iannacone, 1991; 1998).  The free-rider studies find, 
predictably, that the more demanding churches, requiring relatively greater sacrifices, are 
associated with higher levels of participation and support from members (Iannacone, 
1992; 1998).  The human capital and time allocation studies go beyond Smith’s 
examination by generating and testing predictions regarding the timing and extent of 
religious activity (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).  The most recent contribution is the growth 
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literature finding that religious belief is positively associated with economic growth 
(Barro and McCleary, 2003). 
 
The new literature on the economics of religion has only recently begun to 
address two important parts of Smith’s analysis.  One is Smith’s description of religion as 
largely a rational response to real consumer needs,8 rather than arbitrary preferences.  
Smith suggests that religions, particularly new entrants, were social institutions that arose 
in response to social problems.9  The smaller sects that developed in cities were collusive 
societies that monitored and punished members for engaging in conduct, such as 
excessive alcohol consumption, that might bring short run benefits in exchange for long 
term ruin.  The rise of Muslim sects in American inner cities reflects this tendency of 
religions to spring up in response to social problems on the ground.  The Muslims are 
known in cities for an aggressive anti-drug, anti-crime, and anti-welfare program.  The 
Muslim program was adopted in the apparent belief that drug use, crime, and welfare 
dependency were the key social problems in the cities – problems that were being 
addressed by few other social institutions. 
 
B. State Intervention in Religion and Corruption 
 
The other major topic addressed by Smith but so far not adequately addressed in 
the new economics of religion literature is the connection between state regulation of 
religion and corruption.  This takes us back to James Madison’s remarks (though 
Madison had probably read Smith).  State regulation of religion has a corrupting effect on 
religion and on the state. 
 
It is easy to see why a religious institution would prefer to gain some degree of 
power within the government.  A religious institution could benefit from taking 
advantage of the state’s power to tax and regulate rival institutions and to transfer 
subsidies in its direction.  A religion could use the state’s regulatory power to block the 
entry of new religions and to ban competing ones.  The state could require citizens to 
support the established church (or churches) through their taxes. 
 
                                                 
8 Berman (2003) provides the clearest example of recent work viewing religion as a response to consumer 
needs.  Berman explains radical religious groups as emerging in response to government’s failure to 
provide local public goods.  Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (2002) provide another recent example. They 
argue that the monopolistic practices of the Roman Catholic Church put members at the margin of 
defection, making Protestant entry easier.  Theirs is a story of monopoly rent extraction driving consumers 
to a rival firm.  I consider this distinguishable from Smith’s argument that detachment from the interests of 
members invited entry from rival churches willing to meet those preferences. 
9“A man of rank and fortune is by his station the distinguished member of a great society, who attend to 
every part of his conduct,… A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished 
member of any great society.  While he remains in the country village his conduct may be attended to, and 
he may be obliged to attend to it himself.  In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is 
called a character to lose.  But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness.  
His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and 
to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice.  He never emerges so effectually from this 
obscurity, his conduct never excites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming 
the member of a small religious sect.” (Smith, p.795).  
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Taxing and regulating rival religious institutions, for no other reason than to limit 
their growth, is costly for society.  This regulatory policy reduces the size and scope of 
the religious market, reducing societal wealth in the same way that taxation of a market in 
any other item would.  Moreover, this policy creates interest groups, specifically the 
recipients of the taxes and the favored religious institutions, that have incentives to lobby 
for its maintenance. 
 
Subsidization of a favored religious institution, again for no reason other than to 
increase its status relative to others, is also inefficient.  On the other hand, there is a 
countervailing argument.  One could view subsidization as a strong response to the free 
rider problem.  Forcing citizens to support the established church prevents people from 
free riding on the religious investments of others (Iannacone, 1992), and to that extent 
corrects a potential market failure.  The finding in Barro and McCleary (2003) of a 
positive relationship between the state’s promotion of religion and adherence to religious 
beliefs, itself a factor contributing to economic growth, provides some evidence for this 
view.   However, the historical experience discussed by Smith (p, 788-794) suggests that 
the overall effect of subsidizing religion is harmful to welfare. 
 
The state, on the other hand, has self-interested reasons to prefer some degree of 
control over religion, especially where there is an established church.  The key reason is 
self protection.  Smith notes that a ruler who goes against the established church, that is 
not dependent upon him, is unlikely to last long.  The clergy will “proscribe him as a 
profane person, and “employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to 
transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince.”  (Smith, p. 797)  
Given the risk of having a large church seeking to oust him, the ruler is better off trying 
to purchase its allegiance by offering benefits from the state. 
 
The benefits the ruler is likely to offer the favored church are those that are most 
beneficial to the church and at the same time least costly to the ruler.  The church wants 
subsidies from the state; prohibition and taxation of rival churches.  The ruler prefers to 
give benefits that either enhance or do the least damage to his ability to stay in power.  
The most severe taxes and regulations, therefore, will be imposed on religious groups that 
oppose or threaten to oppose the ruler.10   
 
Once this plan of church-state relations is put into effect, there are few limits on 
the degree to which governmental processes can be corrupted.  If we view corruption 
generally as the diversion of government offices and functions to benefit private parties, 
there are many ways in which the type of state intervention described above could 
generate corruption.  The most obvious is the distortion of laws and law enforcement to 
benefit favored religious groups or to burden disfavored ones.  These substantial 
distortions generate wealth transfers from disfavored to favored religions.  Less obvious 
are the many retail level opportunities for bribe collection given to enforcement 
authorities with discretion to enforce religious prohibitions. 
 
                                                 
10 Communist regimes that prohibit or heavily regulate all religions fit this description, if we treat 
communism as equivalent to a state-sanctioned religion.   
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C. A Model 
 
Much of the foregoing can be captured in a simple model.  State intervention in 
religion provides a benefit to society to the extent that it reduces free-riding and behavior 
that violates good-conduct norms.  However, state intervention harms society by 
entrenching the ruler, through the deadweight loss of taxation, and through lobbying 
costs.  State intervention also weakens the church’s incentives by creating over time a 
lazy monopolist, reducing its ability to regulate norm-violating conduct.  The ruler and 
the dominant church may find a partnership in their interests even though it is socially 
harmful. 
 
Let sq represent the share of population in the dominant church when the state 
supports it, and let sp be the share when there is no state support, sq >  sp. 
 
Let v equal the social harm caused by free-riding or violation of church norms.  
Let p equal the frequency with which this social harm occurs when free-riding and the 
violation of church norms is common.  Let q equal the frequency of harm when free-
riding and violation of church norms is relatively infrequent.   Assume that these 
frequencies depend on the share of the population within the dominant church.  In 
particular, assume p = 1 – sp when the church is not supported by the state.  Let q = 1 – sq 
– δ, where δ represents the lazy monopolist effect of government support.  
 
Lobbying secures government support.  If η is the price charged by the church for 
its services, the per-member revenue gain to the church from lobbying is η(sq – sp).  Let 
the per-member cost of lobbying the state for support be cL.  If the church chooses not to 
seek the state’s support, it may find that the state adopts policies that it cannot tolerate. 
The church may then choose to encourage its members to turn against the current ruler.  
Let the expected per-member cost of encouraging church members to reject the ruler be 
cR .  The church will prefer lobbying for state intervention if 
 
         ηsq  – cL  >  ηsp – cR ,    (1) 
 
or, equivalently, 
 
       η(sq – sp) – cL + cR  > 0 .   (2) 
 
In simpler terms, successful lobbying benefits the church by increasing its revenue and by 
avoiding the cost of encouraging dissent. 
 
Now consider the incentives of the ruler.  The ruler has an incentive to seek the 
church’s support in order to stay in power.  Let the social cost of the resulting 
entrenchment be θ.  The ruler gets some share of the social cost of entrenchment as a 
benefit or direct transfer; let that share be αθ.  The ruler also gains to the extent that the 
dominant church’s status benefits society.  The benefit to society from the dominant 
church’s protected status is (p-q)v = (sq – sp – δ)v, and the ruler will internalize the share 
α(sq – sp – δ)v. The ruler gives up something by supporting the dominant church; 
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specifically, the freedom to choose the best policies from his perspective.  Let the cost of 
these restrictions be a simple linear function of the lobbying investment of the church: 
ρLcL.  On the other hand, if the ruler does not support the dominant church, he runs the 
risk of having the church turn against him.  Let that cost be a simple linear function of the 
church’s investment in revolt: ρRcR.  The ruler will prefer to join forces with the church if 
 
         α[θ  +  (sq – sp – δ)v] – ρLcL   > –  ρRcR   .   (2) 
 
Finally, consider the social welfare condition.  Let the social costs of the church’s 
different lobbying strategies (for support or revolt) be given by βLcL and βRcR.  The social 
cost when there is no intervention (free-riding is common) is simply pv + βRcR.  The 
social cost when there is intervention is qv + βLcL + τ + θ, where τ is the deadweight loss 
of taxation.  State intervention to support the dominant church is socially desirable if the 
gains from preventing free-riding and norm violations exceed the social costs of 
lobbying, government entrenchment, and the deadweight loss of taxation, i.e., 
 
     (sq – sp)v  > βLcL – βRcR + τ + θ + δv .   (3) 
 
A partnership may be in the interests of both the ruler and the church when it is 
not in the social interest (conditions (1) and (2) hold and reverse the inequality in (3)).  
Region I (the cross-hatched area) in Figure 1 shows the parameter space in which a 
partnership is mutually beneficial but not in the social interest.  In intuitive terms: for the 
dominant church, the revenue from lobbying exceeds the net costs; for the ruler, the 
captured gain from supporting the dominant church exceeds the cost of the restrictions; 
while for society, the social cost of entrenchment, inefficient policies, and lobbying 
exceeds the social gain from the state’s promotion of the dominant church.  Region II 
shows the parameter space in which a partnership is mutually beneficial and in the social 
interest.  In Region III (the un-shaded area above the dotted line), it is individually 
rational for the church to seek a partnership, but not in the state’s interest. 
 
So far this model shows only that it is possible for both dominant church and ruler 
to prefer state support when such support is socially undesirable.  The statement that this 
is likely to be the result follows from the effects over time.  The lazy monopolist effect δ, 
an important part of Smith’s analysis, is likely to grow over time.  Similarly, the costs of 
entrenchment and inefficient policies (τ + θ) also grow over time (as power corrupts).  
The result is that state support reduces social welfare.  To see this in Figure 1, as δ and τ 
increase over time, the relative size of Region II shrinks; and as θ increases (other 
parameters held fixed) so does the likelihood of the outcome being in Region I. 
 
Region II
Region III
Region I
sq - sp =
cL - cR
η
sq - sp 
θ
sq - sp  = 



 + δ
 θβLcL  -  βRcR + τ 
v v
+
sq - sp  = 



 + δ
 θρLcL  -  ρRcR 
αv v
-
Figure 1
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One may well ask what is special about religion.  Any corporation would prefer to 
have a relationship with the state in which it received state subsidies and its rivals were 
taxed.  Religion, however, holds a power over the thoughts and actions of ordinary 
people that is rarely seen among private corporations.  Under the secularization thesis 
often attributed to Hume, this power would eventually wane as the public’s level of 
education in science increased.  However, the evidence does not show that religious 
attachment has faded over time (Iannoccone, 1998). 
 
Most modern religions, rather than being simply the byproducts of earlier 
superstitions, take rules that are clearly desirable (e.g., do not kill) and anchor them 
within a set of beliefs that are supposed to be accepted without question.  Man’s ability to 
hold on to such beliefs, often irrationally, presumably conferred an evolutionary 
advantage (Wilson, 2002).  This ability is unlikely to fade over time, as the secularization 
thesis predicts, unless natural selection pressures make it a disadvantage.  The special 
feature of religion, in comparison to any other social institution, may be its ability to take 
advantage of the human capacity to commit to an abstract principle, in spite of the 
evidence against it. 
 
As we noted earlier, in addition to Smith, the other early economic treatment of 
religion is that of Marx.  Under the Marxian view, religion is a tool that the capitalist 
state uses in order to keep the mass of laborers in their exploited conditions without 
questioning society’s design. 
 
To sum up, there are two general economic approaches to religion, a rent-seeking 
model and an efficiency model.  The rent-seeking approach includes the work of Adam 
Smith and that of Karl Marx, though their theories and implications differ.  The 
efficiency approach is reflected in the literature stressing religion’s role (and the state’s 
supportive role) as a solution to the public goods problem. 
 
IV. Data and Hypotheses 
 
Our goal is to examine the empirical evidence for the Smithian (Madisonian), 
Marxian, and efficiency views of the state regulation of religion.  Specifically, we 
examine the effect of the state’s regulation of religion on corruption, economic growth, 
and inequality.  The state’s regulatory practices are summarized by a set of variables 
measuring the state’s efforts to subsidize or burden (regulate) religious institutions and 
practices.  In the remainder of this paper, we examine the effect of each of the regulatory 
variables on corruption, growth, and inequality.  The primary variables used in this 
analysis are described in Table 1. 
 
In this part, we set out our predictions regarding the effects of the explanatory 
variables in Table 1a on corruption, economic growth and inequality.  We will focus 
below on the predicted effects of our “church and state” variables: Staterelcons, 
Lawburdenrel, Lawbenrel, Practburdenrel, and Practbenrel. 
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Table 1b shows correlations among most of the independent variables of Table 
1a.  Of the factors correlated with the presence of laws benefiting religion only one stands 
out: common-law countries are less likely than others to enact laws that benefit religion.  
Of the factors correlated with the presence of laws burdening religion, several stand out.  
First, governments that have laws that burden religion also adopt practices that burden 
religion.  Second, Catholic countries and democracies do not enact laws that burden 
religion.  Third, Muslim countries tend to adopt laws that burden religion.  Fourth, 
countries with a socialist legal tradition tend to adopt laws that burden religion.  Of the 
factors correlated with government practices that burden religion, two stand out.  Catholic 
countries do not adopt practices that burden religion, while Muslim countries do. 
 
A. Corruption 
The corruption measure we use is the 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
compiled by Transparency International.  The index measures perceptions of the degree 
of corruption among public officials, based on surveys of business people and analysts.  
The index ranges from 10 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt) for 93 countries in our 
sample.  Since lower levels of corruption are associated with higher numbers in the index, 
all variables that enhance corruption will have a negative sign in the corruption 
regressions.  Similarly, all variables that reduce corruption will have a positive sign in the 
corruption regression. 
 
1. “Church-State Intervention” Variables 
 
The rent-seeking theory emphasized in this paper implies a positive relationship 
(negative regression coefficient) between corruption and the existence of an official 
religion named in the state’s constitution (Staterelcons).  The reason is that the official 
church would use its special status to gain advantages relative to other religions, and to 
compel support from the public (e.g., blocking entry of rivals).  To the extent that the 
favored religion is that of a particular subpopulation, which could be defined by ethnic or 
racial as well as religious ties, that group could effectively use the special relationship 
between the state and the official church to expropriate wealth from other subpopulations.  
These arguments suggest that the existence of an official religion should be positively 
associated with corruption. 
 
There is an alternative view of the effect of a state religion suggested in the free-
riding literature (e.g., Iannacone, 1992) and in the work of Barro and McCleary (2003, 
2005).  To the extent that an official religion is subsidized, it promotes religious 
attachment and belief by making it less costly.  To the extent these characteristics reduce 
corruption,11 we should expect a negative relationship between the existence of an 
official religion and corruption. 
 
                                                 
11 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) find that religious beliefs are associated with “good” economic 
attitudes, in the sense of being conducive to higher income and growth. 
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These arguments imply that the existence of an official religion has opposing 
effects on the level of corruption.  There is a positive (corruption-enhancing) effect 
suggested in this paper’s framework, which leads to more corruption all else the same.  
There is also a corruption-reducing effect through the subsidization of religious 
attachment.  All of this implies that the sign of our state religion variable (Staterelcons) is 
ambiguous a priori.  The regression results will reveal which of the opposing effects 
dominates. 
 
The contradictory effects on corruption implied by the existence of a state religion 
are also implied by the existence of laws favoring religion (Lawbenrel) and of practices 
favoring religion (Practbenrel).   The existence of laws benefiting religion is likely to 
promote corruption for the same reasons that the existence of an official religion is likely 
to.  On the other hand, subsidization may reduce corruption by promoting greater 
adherence to religious norms (e.g., truth telling) that are inconsistent with corrupt 
practices. 
 
The existence of laws burdening religion and of practices burdening religion 
(Lawburdenrel and Practburdenrel respectively) should both be positively associated 
with the level of corruption under this paper’s framework (Smith-Madison model).  There 
are no offsetting social benefits, such as the prevention of free-riding, that would reduce 
their harmful effects.  The presence of laws or practices burdening a particular religion or 
set of religions reduce the scope of the market in religion and creates interest groups that 
have incentives to maintain those laws and to seek their expansion.  
 
2. Other Variables 
 
The other variables used in the corruption regression control for the type of 
regulation generally (Socialist), the size of the public sector (Govconsump2000), the type 
of legal regime (Commonlaw),12 the existence of democratic procedures (Democformal, 
Democlimit,Democold, Democnew), and the percentages of Catholics and Muslims 
(Catholic, Muslim). 
 
Some empirical literature has suggested that democracies and common law 
systems tend to be less corrupt than their alternatives (see, e.g., Lipset and Lenz, 2000 
(democracy); Mocan, 2004 (common law)).  The link between corruption and democracy 
is intuitive.  Rampant corruption reduces wealth.  The typical voter is likely to be hurt by 
rampant corruption, and will vote against highly corrupt governments.13  But the 
                                                 
12 An attractive alternative approach, adopted in Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2004, codes 
for different legal traditions.  Specifically, Glaeser et al. introduce variables for English, Socialist, German, 
Scandinavian, and French legal regimes.  Our preference is to use the common law indicator alone, since it 
is the clearest procedural distinction among types of legal regimes observed.  Common law is decentralized 
in its evolutionary process, while civil law tends to be centralized.  The creation of narrow legal categories 
introduces distinctions that are based as much on legal substance as on legal procedure.  This introduces 
new difficulties for any study, such as this one, that examines the impact of differences in substantive laws. 
13 Mocan (2004) treats democracy as endogenous in a regression with corruption as the dependant variable, 
on the theory that is correlated with an omitted “culture” variable that also determines corruption.  We treat 
the democracy as exogenous in our regressions.  Rather than being a function of culture, political freedom 
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estimated relationship between democracy and corruption appears to depend on how 
democracy is measured.  The well known “Polity IV” democracy index, which codes the 
strength of democratic procedures on a scale of one to ten, is negatively correlated with 
corruption (Lipset and Lenz).  However, another set of studies suggests that it is not the 
existence of democracy that matters but the age or stability of democracy.  Old 
democracies are less corrupt than young democracies (Keefer, 2005). 
 
As Glaeser et al. (2004) note, the Polity IV measure of democracy reflects not 
only the existence of democratic procedures, but the extent to which governments adhere 
to them as well.  Since corrupt regimes are likely to take steps to obstruct the democratic 
process, one should expect corrupt regimes to also have low scores on the Polity measure 
of democracy.  Because of this problem, we use variables that code for the existence of 
formal democratic procedures, making no attempt to account for the success of those 
procedures.  In other words, Democformal counts a country as a democracy if it has 
formal democratic procedures, even if the existing government pays off and bullies voters 
in order to stay in office. 
 
The link between corruption and common law has also been suggested in the 
empirical literature (e.g., Mocan, 2004), though the link is less intuitively obvious than 
that between corruption and democracy.  Why is the common law system associated with 
low levels of corruption?  There are several potential explanations.  One is judicial 
independence: judges in common law countries typically enjoy life appointments.  They 
are not worried that judicial decisions adverse to the current ruling regime will result in 
their removal from office.  Another reason is that common law rules are protective of 
property rights, constraining state functionaries from expropriating wealth from citizens.  
Yet another reason is that common law rules are of general application, and do not 
provide special protections to identifiable groups, which makes them poor instruments for 
expropriating or redistributing wealth (see, e.g., Hayek, 1960, 148-161; Epstein, 1982). 
 
Previous research has also shown the relationship between adherence to certain 
religious beliefs and corruption.  Lipset and Lenz (2000) find that corruption tends to be 
negatively associated with adherence to Protestantism, and suggest that it is positively 
associated with adherence to Catholicism.  This is not because the Catholic faith 
explicitly promotes corruption.  The more plausible explanation is that the Catholic faith, 
in comparison to others, tends to downplay the importance of personal responsibility for 
one’s lot, and to emphasize society’s responsibility for the less fortunate (e.g., Lipset and 
Lenz, at 119).14  These norms tend to promote interventionist regimes that seek to 
redistribute income, which, in turn, provide fertile ground for corruption. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
appears to have arisen generally as a byproduct of economic freedom (Friedman, 1962; Smith, 1978, 
pp.187-88; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2004).  The economic view of political freedom 
suggests that the existence of democracy would be virtually a proxy for decentralization of control over 
resources. 
14 An alternative theory is that the Catholic tradition emphasizes the vertical bond with the church while 
downplaying the horizontal bond with fellow citizens, undermining trust.  Putnam (1993). 
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Whether the state’s regulatory framework is socialist has implications for 
corruption.  Socialist systems restrict a wide range of ordinary market activity, 
eliminating property rights and creating unregulated black markets.  State officials, who 
typically receive low pay, are tempted to appropriate state property and are often willing 
to accept bribes in order to permit market transactions to occur.  Given these incentives, 
one expects the presence of a socialist regulatory system to be positively associated with 
corruption. 
 
The size of the public sector relative to the economy (Govconsump2000) has 
ambiguous implications for corruption.  On one hand, a larger public sector implies more 
regulation, more licensing authorities, and more opportunities for corruption to flourish.  
This suggests pubic sector spending relative to GDP should be positively associated with 
the level of corruption.  On the other hand, a larger public sector typically means that 
public sector employees are being paid more, so they have a lower incentive to take 
bribes.  In many countries with large public sectors, policemen are actually being paid 
relatively well in order to enforce the law.  In some countries with small public sectors, 
policemen are paid poorly, so they make up the shortfall in income by accepting bribes.  
These considerations suggest that the size of the public sector relative to GDP will be 
negatively associated with the level of corruption.  Summing up, the relationship between 
public sector’s share of the economy and corruption is ambiguous a priori. 
 
B. Growth 
 
Since corruption hinders economic growth (Mauro, 1995), the implications of this 
framework for the growth regressions follow from those for the corruption regressions.  
Specifically, the existence of an official religion and the both the existence of laws and 
the existence of practices benefiting religion are predicted to have ambiguous effects on 
growth.  Whether these types of subsidization enhance economic growth, say, by 
promoting adherence to growth-productive norms, or retard growth by encouraging rent 
seeking on the part of subsidized groups will be revealed by the regression results.  On 
the other hand, both the existence of laws and the existence of practices burdening 
religion should tend to retard growth, because these policies seldom have significant 
social benefits. 
 
In addition to the state-religion variables, we have included the other variables 
used in the corruption regression, and additional variables that are typically used in 
growth regressions (Barro, 1991).  We expect the other variables used in the corruption 
regression (Democformal, Commonlaw, and others) to have the same predicted signs as 
in the corruption regression.  The additional variables (not used in the corruption 
regression) should have the same signs as those reported in the literature (Barro, 1991). 
 
C. Inequality 
 
In order to compare this paper’s framework with the Marxian view of the state’s 
use of religion, we examine below the effects of state regulation of religion on inequality.  
Under this Smith-Madison view adopted in this paper, state-sponsored burdens and 
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subsidies to religion contribute to rent seeking and corruption.  However, neither rent-
seeking nor corruption has an absolutely clear implication for the degree of inequality.  In 
spite of this, the more likely effect is an enhancement of inequality, given that politically 
dominant factions are also likely to be relatively wealthy. 
 
The efficiency model does not have clear implications for inequality.  If religions 
provide norms that solve social problems, state subsidization should make society more 
productive.  However, enhancing productivity could either increase or reduce inequality, 
depending on the whether the productivity enhancements go to upper or lower income 
classes. 
 
The Marxian theory implies that state control over religion should enhance the 
degree of inequality.  The reason is that the state uses religion under this theory in order 
to keep people in their places.  Put another way, religion is used to foster acceptance of 
an exploitative social order.  This implies that both laws subsidizing and burdening 
religion should be designed to prevent social upheaval from exploited classes.  Laws and 
practices subsidizing religion should aim chiefly to promote those religions that counsel 
acceptance of the social order.  With the risk of upheaval reduced owners of capital are in 
a better position to exploit laborers more severely, which should make economic 
inequality more severe. 
 
V. Results 
 
A. Corruption 
 
Results for the estimation of the church-state relationship on corruption appear in 
Tables 2a and 2b below.  The first column (Table 2a) includes all of the variables used in 
this part of the analysis.  The second column drops all of the variables coding for 
government practices, since unlike laws they cannot be described as reflecting constraints 
on, or explicit authorizations of, government action.  We address the endogeneity 
problem in Table 2b. 
 
The second and third regressions (Table 2a) drop insignificant variables or 
variables that are correlated with one or more of the state-religion variables.  Regressions 
four and five repeat results of the previous regressions while employing different 
democracy indicators. 
 
1. “Church-State Intervention” Variables 
 
The results suggest that both the existence of laws burdening religion and the 
existence of practices burdening religion increase corruption.  Lawburdenrel and 
Practburdenrel are both statistically significant and have the expected negative signs in 
Table 2a.  This supports the rent-seeking model of church-state relations originally set out 
by Adam Smith and elaborated in this paper. 
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Laws burdening religion are likely to be observed in regimes in which favored 
elites (including favored religious groups) have gained the power to direct the state’s 
regulatory efforts toward the suppression of religious groups that threaten their 
dominance.  The state is most likely to wield this power in a manner least harmful to 
itself, primarily by putting the greatest burdens on groups hostile to the ruling regime.  
This provides an environment in which corruption is likely to flourish. 
 
 The corruptive effect of legal constraints on religious practices appears to be 
largest in the fourth regression, which drops the socialist law indicator.  As Table 1b 
shows, countries in the socialist legal tradition tend to have laws burdening religious 
practice.  When the socialist legal tradition indicator is dropped, the variable reflecting 
the presence of laws burdening religion takes on a larger significance because it reflects 
the corruptive effect of socialism. 
 
The results for laws and practices benefiting religion are statistically insignificant.  
In the regressions in Table 2a there are three variables that capture the state’s efforts to 
subsidize religion.  One indicates the presence of laws benefiting religion (Lawbenrel).  
Another indicates the presence of practices benefiting religion (Practbenrel).  The third 
indicates the presence of an official state religion named in the country’s constitution 
(Staterelcons).  We will discuss the three in order below. 
 
Laws benefiting religion appear to enhance corruption, but the results are 
statistically insignificant.  We noted earlier that laws subsidizing religion could have 
offsetting effects; increasing corruption by encouraging rent-seeking, reducing corruption 
by encouraging adherence to desirable religious norms.  The weak effects for laws 
benefiting religion are consistent with the offsetting-effects hypothesis. 
 
Practices benefiting religion (Practbenrel) appear neither to enhance nor reduce 
corruption.  The coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant and have different 
signs.  This is also consistent with the offsetting-effects hypothesis. 
 
The existence of an official religion declared in the country’s constitution 
(Staterelcons) is negatively associated with corruption, though it has a statistically 
insignificant effect.  The naming of an official religion presumably comes with some 
state benefits for the favored religion, if nothing more than the state’s expression of 
preference.  This suggests that the naming of an official religion should have the same 
effect as the subsidy variables, Lawbenrel and Practbenrel.  In other words, we should 
expect offsetting effects on corruption.  The offsetting-effects hypothesis is confirmed by 
the weak regression results. 
 
Although our state religion variable differs from that used in Barro and McCleary 
(2003), our finding that the presence of an official religion does not enhance corruption is 
consistent with their results.  They find that the presence of a state religion enhances 
church attendance and religious attachment rather than reducing both.  The prediction 
that both would be reduced follows from Adam Smith’s argument that state support led 
established churches to grow indifferent to the needs of congregants.  Barro and 
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McCleary (2002) hypothesize that their finding of an enhancement in attachment and 
attendance results because of the subsidies that flow in favor of the official religion. 
 
2. Other Variables 
 
Most of the remaining variables in the corruption regression have expected signs.  
Illiteracy is positively associated with corruption.  Lipset and Linz (2000) say that this is 
because corruption is more likely to be caught in a more educated society, and citizens 
are more likely to be aware of norms that are consistent with sound government.  The 
same can be said of urbanization, which by enhancing the flow of information makes it 
more likely that corrupt practices will be caught.  Consistent with this prediction, the 
urbanization rate is negatively associated with corruption. 
 
The results for the democracy variables are difficult to explain initially, since they 
imply that democracy enhances corruption.  Recall that the basic democracy indicator, 
Democformal, is a dummy variable taking the value one if there are no legal limitations 
on the power of citizens to change their government.  Of ninety-three countries in the 
regression sample, eighty-seven are formal democracies in this sense.  The other 
democracy measure, Democlimit, takes the value one if there are significant legal 
limitations on the power of citizens to change the government.  Two of the countries in 
the regression sample (Jordan and Morocco) are limited democracies.  In the remaining 
four countries (Vietnam, China, Egypt, Pakistan) citizens do not (or did not during the 
sample period) have the power to change their government. 
 
The results show that it is easy to be a formal democracy and corrupt at the same 
time.  There are many corrupt regimes in which citizens have the formal power to vote 
the current government out of office.  However, they are often unable to do so because 
corrupt regimes find ways to hang on to power by buying votes and bullying opponents.  
Because of this, the average formal democracy in the sample is, perhaps paradoxically, 
more corrupt than is the average non-democracy in the sample. 
 
To further explore the relationship between democracy and corruption we split up 
the formal democracy variable into two categories: old formal democracies (Democold) 
and new formal democracies (Democnew).  The new formal democracy variable selects 
out regions in which most of the democracies are new: Africa, the formerly Socialist 
countries, and Latin America.  There is evidence suggesting that the quality of 
government is higher in older formal democracies (Keefer, 2005).  The results in columns 
five through seven of Table 2a are consistent with this claim.  They suggest that the 
positive association between corruption and formal democracy is limited to new 
democracies. 
 
The effect of having a socialist legal foundation weakens substantially in the 
regressions that separate old and new democracies.  The reason for this is that the new 
democracies include many of the formerly socialist states.  Of the 20 countries in the 
regression sample that are classified as having a socialist legal tradition, 18 are also new 
democracies. 
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 Government consumption as a percentage of GDP (Govconsump2000) is 
negatively associated with corruption.  As we noted before, enhancing the public sector 
relative to the economy probably has two effects.  By increasing the sheer size of the 
bureaucracy, putting in more officials to demand licenses, government spending enhances 
corruption.  On the other hand, by paying police officers more, government spending 
reduces corruption by reducing the incentives law enforcement agents have to accept 
bribes.  The results suggest that the latter effect dominates. 
 
The effect of the population percentage of Catholics is positively associated with 
corruption, with a statistically significant coefficient in all of the regressions in Table 2a.  
This is consistent with the findings of Lipset and Linz (2000), who suggest that Catholic 
doctrine may foster corruption by downplaying the connection between individual 
responsibility and economic or social status.15  However, LaPorta et al. (1999) find that 
the percent-Catholic effect on corruption weakens to statistical insignificance once 
variables controlling for legal origin are included. 
 
3. Instrumental Variables Regression 
 
The approach taken up to this point reflects an assumption that the existence of 
laws and practices burdening religion results from the absence of constitutional or 
cultural constraints on such intervention.  The intervention itself fosters corruption, for 
reasons given in Part III.  However, there is an alternative view that the state’s 
intervention into religious matters is a byproduct of its inherently corrupt nature – i.e., 
corruption causes the state to intervene into religion.  We find this view less attractive 
because it posits inherent corruption as an essential quality of certain governments, 
without explaining how this inherent quality appeared.  However, it is a view that cannot 
be rejected a priori, or on the ground that it is inconsistent with our evidence.  Under the 
alternative view that posits an inherent tendency toward corruption in some governments, 
the variables indicating the existence of laws and of practices burdening religion are 
endogenous. 
 
In view of this problem, we ran instrumental variables regressions.  Our 
instrument choice was based on Smith’s theory, formalized in Part III.C.  Ideal 
instruments would be variables that explain a state’s decision to intervene in religion, but 
would not be determined by or a function of corruption.   
 
The core instrument we used is a measure of the degree of religious plurality, 
which is calculated by summing the squared market shares of the major religions (Barro 
and McCleary, 2003).  Under Smith’s theory, religious plurality generates greater 
tolerance and diminishes the state’s incentive to align with a particular dominant church.  
The remaining instruments attempt to capture the social conditions that would work 
against tolerance, such as illiteracy.  Urbanization is also a factor that should reduce 
                                                 
15 The result seems inconsistent at first glance with Barro and McLeary’s (2003) findings that religious 
adherence is positively related to economic growth, but it need not be.  Catholicism could be positively 
associated with both corruption and growth. 
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tolerance, since it means that different religions would practice side-by-side in a crowded 
space.  Population size, other things equal, should give a ruler a greater incentive to align 
with a dominant church.  Our instrument panel consisted of variables that should affect 
the degree of tolerance.  All of the additional instruments are lagged 10 years (from 
1990).  Most of them are interacted with plurality, as explained in the notes to Table 2b. 
We continue to treat the naming of an official religion in the state’s constitution as 
exogenous in the corruption regression. 
 
The results of the instrumental variable regressions appear in Table 2b.  The new 
results are consistent with those of the ordinary least squares regressions in Table 2a.  
Unlike the results in Table 2a, the results in Table 2b suggest that state imposed benefits 
as well as burdens on religion foster corruption.  There are statistically significant 
negative coefficients for the existence of a state religion in the constitution (Staterelcons), 
and for laws benefiting religion (Lawbenrel).  The negative estimate for laws benefiting 
religion is consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis.  On the other hand, the positive 
estimates for Staterelcons lends support to the view that a religious subsidy of this form 
enhances compliance with religious norms (Barro and McCleary, 2003). 
 
B. Growth 
 
Results for the impact of the church-state relationship on economic growth are 
presented in Table 3.  We report six regressions in the table, where the dependent 
variable is real economic growth between 1991 and 2000.  The basic regression is styled 
after the growth regressions in Barro (1991).16  As we did in the previous section, we 
begin with a “kitchen sink” regression (all of the variables) followed by sparser models 
that drop insignificant variables. 
 
1. “Church-State Intervention” Variables 
 
There is weak evidence in Table 3 that the relationship between church and state 
affects economic growth.  In general, the results suggest that laws burdening religion 
harm economic growth.  On the other hand, practices burdening religion, and both laws 
and practices benefiting religion do not appear to affect growth.  The coefficient for the 
variable indicating the existence of laws burdening religion (Lawburdenrel) appears with 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient in six of the regressions in Table 3. 
 
The existence of practices burdening religion does not appear to affect growth, 
while it does appear to affect corruption (Table 2a).  This suggests that the corruptive 
impact of these practices is not substantial enough to hurt growth.  The beneficial 
interventions (both laws and practices) appear to affect neither corruption nor growth. 
 
2. Other Variables 
                                                 
16 There are some differences between the regression here and Barro’s.  For example, although it is 
statistically insignificant, we decided to include the interaction between population and the indicator of 
openness to trade (Expimpgdp) in every regression.  The reason was to control for countries such as China 
and India, with large populations and relatively open economies (Fischer, 2003). 
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 The socialist law indicator has the biggest impact on growth.  The regression 
suggests that socialism takes 3 percentage points off the growth rate of an economy.  In 
comparison, common law appears to have no effect on growth, especially when the 
regression controls for socialist law.  This contradicts the results of Mahoney (2001), 
which showed common law having a positive impact on growth. 
 
Formal democracies do not appear to grow any faster than non-democracies.  
Democformal, which indicates formal democracy, has a negative sign in every regression 
and is statistically significant in the last one.  For comparison purposes, we included the 
Polity IV measure of democracy in column 3.  Including the Polity IV democracy index 
causes the estimated effect of laws burdening religion (Lawburdenrel) to fall 
substantially.  Presumably this occurs because regimes that intervene legally to burden 
religions also score low on the Polity IV democracy index.  Clearly, the church-state 
intervention variables reflect the general interventionist stance of a state, and in light of 
this perhaps the more remarkable result is that Lawburdenrel remains marginally 
significant when the Polity IV democracy index is included. 
 
Population size, population growth, primary education, and investment all appear 
to enhance growth, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Barro, 1991).  The negative 
result for government spending suggests that it hurts growth, even though the results from 
Tables 2a and 2b suggested that it reduces corruption.  In other words, paying public 
sector workers more may help reduce corruption, but the inefficiency of the public sector 
remains a drag on growth. 
 
C. Inequality 
 
As we noted earlier, the effects of religious regulation on inequality are 
ambiguous a priori.  The Marxian position offers the most straightforward view of the 
connection between inequality and religious regulation.  Under this view, state regulation 
should be associated with increased inequality, since the purpose of religion is to entice 
the public into accepting an expropriative relationship between capitalists and laborers. 
 
Adam Smith’s version of the rent-seeking model implies that the dominant church 
and the state enter into a mutually protective relationship in which state benefits flow 
disproportionately to the favored church.  If rent-seeking behavior increases inequality, 
then an expansion in state-sponsored burdens or subsidies should be associated with an 
increase in inequality, and conversely. 
 
The efficiency theory yields ambiguous implications, since an increase in 
productivity could enhance or reduce inequality, depending on the distribution of 
productivity enhancements.  To illustrate the ambiguous implications of the efficiency 
theory, consider a productivity-enhancing investment, such as education.  As it happens, 
primary education enhances inequality significantly (Table 4).  Still, one assumes that 
primary education is good for growth, and that is confirmed the results in Table 3.  This 
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suggests that a law subsidizing religion could be good for growth, as suggested by the 
results in Table 3, and also increase inequality. 
 
We adopted the model used for the growth regressions to study the effects state 
regulation of religion has on inequality.  The dependent variable is the Gini index, which 
measures inequality over the distribution of income or consumption, with a value of 0 
representing perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality.  The Gini index 
data are from the World Bank, based on surveys conducted over the 1990s.17  Since the 
survey years differ, we included a time trend to capture the effect of passage of time.  
And since some Gini measures were based on consumption rather than income, we 
included a dummy variable to indicate the consumption-based measures.  The regressions 
results in Table 4 assume that the snapshot of inequality provided by the Gini index is 
representative of the 1990s. 
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that state subsidization of religion does not have a 
substantial impact on inequality.  Laws benefiting religion (Staterelcons and Lawbenrel) 
appear to have no significant effect on inequality.  Having an official state religion is 
negatively associated with inequality, but the effect is statistically insignificant in every 
regression.  Practices that subsidize religion (Practbenrel) are also negatively associated 
with inequality, though the results are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
 
The one exception to the general finding of “no effect” is the result for laws 
burdening religion.  The presence of laws burdening religion appears to enhance 
inequality, with a positive and statistically significant effect in five of the six regressions 
reported in Table 4.  Practices burdening religion (Practburdenrel) have a statistically 
insignificant impact in all regressions.18 
 
To provide a rough summary, laws and practices subsidizing religion are 
negatively associated with inequality, but the effect is statistically insignificant for the 
most part.  Laws and practices burdening religion, on the other hand, are positively 
associated with inequality.  The effect is statistically significant only in the case of laws 
that burden religion.  The finding that laws burdening religion are positively associated 
with inequality is the flip side of the coin for the growth regressions, which showed that 
legal burdens are negatively associated with growth. 
 
We noted earlier, in connection with the growth regressions, that the religious 
subsidies could have offsetting effects: enhancing productivity by promoting beneficial 
norms and reducing wealth by encouraging rent-seeking.  The marginally significant 
results for practices benefiting religion are consistent with the offsetting effects 
hypothesis, provided we take a certain view of the incidence of the productivity effect.  
                                                 
17 However, one observation, for Uruguay, is from 1989. 
18 As for the “other variables” (not measuring state burdens and benefits to religion), the most interesting 
result is that for the population and trade-openness interaction term (Popexpimpgdp), which suggests that 
trade has an inequality reducing effect that gets stronger with population size.  Since international trade 
presumably occurs only after an economy has reached a sufficient scale, this result suggests one 
mechanism that could generate an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and income (Kuznets, 
1955). 
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The productivity enhancing effect of religious subsidies would reduce inequality if they 
primarily impacted individuals on the lower end of the income spectrum.  The results in 
Table 4 are consistent with this theory, though they fall far short of providing solid 
empirical support. 
 
If indeed the productivity enhancing effects of religion are negatively related to 
income, we might gain a different understanding of the empirical finding that church 
attendance is not affected by income (e.g., Iannacone, 1998, p. 1473).  The findings on 
church attendance seem counterintuitive at first glance.  The notion that the poor have 
always found a greater need for their churches than the rich is a common observation.  
Adam Smith, remarking on the harms of slavery, pointed to banishment from established 
churches as one of the most significant, given the great importance of religion among the 
poor (Smith, 1978, p.179-82).  Our results suggesting that productivity enhancements go 
largely to the poor, coupled with the finding in the literature that church attendance is not 
reduced by income, suggest that churches serve different functions for the poor and the 
rich.  For the poor, the services provided by churches have a material effect on their 
working lives.   For the rich, churches may serve a primarily social function.  Overall 
church involvement may not change as income increases, but the type of benefits enjoyed 
by members changes greatly with income. 
 
We are inclined to view these results as more consistent with Smith’s description 
of the nature of religious regulation than that of Marx’s.  Marx’s view is that the state 
promotes religion in order to enhance inequality.  There is no support for this in the 
results.  On the other hand, Smith’s view of state capture is easily reconciled with the 
finding that laws burdening religion have a positive and significant effect on inequality. 
 
The efficiency theory, the notion that the state subsidizes or burdens religion in 
order to enhance the public good provision of religions, appears to gain weak support 
from the results for the subsidy variables, which show a negative relationship between 
subsidization and inequality – provided we stick with the weakly-confirmed view that the 
productivity enhancements flow largely to lower economic classes.  But the inequality 
effects are weak and statistically insignificant.  Moreover, the efficiency theory, again 
coupled with the assumption that the productivity effects go largely to lower economic 
classes, is contradicted by the results of the burden variables, which show constraints on 
religious expression to be associated with greater inequality.  Admittedly, the efficiency 
theory has ambiguous implications, since its implications depend on the distribution of 
productivity enhancements.  However, the results as they stand provide no support for it 
and appear on the most straightforward reading to contradict it. 
 
D. Summary and Policy Implications 
 
The “hard” or statistically significant results of the empirical analysis can be 
summarized as follows.  Laws and practices burdening religion enhance corruption.  
Laws burdening religion reduce economic growth.  Laws burdening religion enhance 
inequality.  The “soft” or statistically weak finding is that inequality is positively 
associated with practices subsidizing religion.  Of the three frameworks examined, the 
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efficiency model, the Marxian model, and the Smith-Madison model, we view these 
results as most consistent with the Smith-Madison rent-seeking model. 
 
Our findings have implications for the debate over the optimal degree of 
separation between church and state.  Earlier in this paper, we distinguished the 
Madisonian and Jeffersonian views, which have dominated the American debate for 
many years.  The Madisonian approach prohibits state regulation of religion in order to 
prevent concrete problems such as monopolization and corruption.  The Jeffersonian 
view seeks to erect a strict separation between state action and all religious activity. 
 
To illustrate the implications of this study, consider vouchers as a case study.  In 
Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it does not violate the First 
Amendment for students to use state-funded vouchers to attend religious educational 
institutions.  Of course, the vouchers question can be framed more generally: should the 
state prohibit the use of publicly funded vouchers for the purchase of any goods or 
services from religious institutions? 
 
The Jeffersonian, strict separation view appears to offer a simple answer: the state 
should prohibit the use of vouchers at religious institutions.  Any such use involves the 
state indirectly subsidizing a religious institution.  The religious institutions that receive 
the largest amount of indirect state funding would grow relative others. 
 
The Smith-Madison framework offers a different perspective.  The Smith-
Madison approach asks whether the proposed policy would have the effect of permitting 
a state-favored religion to obtain or maintain an advantage over rivals, or of permitting 
the state itself to protect its control of power by suppressing potentially threatening 
religious activity.  Both of these questions lead to a largely favorable view of vouchers.  
As long as they are in the hands of individuals to spend as they please, they do not 
provide any particular church with a competitive advantage over rivals.  More 
importantly, vouchers can have the effect of weakening rather than enhancing the state’s 
power to suppress potentially threatening religious expression.  Moreover, vouchers 
enhance competition among religious institutions, and between religious institutions and 
state-funded non-religious institutions that provide similar services. 
 
Many have noted before that the market in educational services would benefit, as 
do all markets, from competition.  However, Smith’s arguments suggest benefits for the 
market in religious services as well.  Since vouchers enhance competition in the market 
for religious services, they offer the potential, suggested by Smith, of reducing the degree 
of religious strife.  Of course, much of this depends on how the voucher scheme is 
administered (Blasi, 2002). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The literature on church and state has tended to focus on the question of 
interference: what is the proper degree to which the state can either tax or subsidize 
religion?  We have avoided the question of interference here, and instead examined the 
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concrete consequences of state burdens and subsidies on religious institutions.  Our hope 
is that by identifying the concrete consequences, we can gain a better sense of the most 
plausible functions that might be served by a state guarantee of religious liberty.  Our 
findings suggest that state regulation or suppression of religious activity fosters 
corruption, with negative consequences for economic growth and inequality. 
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Table 1a 
 
Variable name Variable description Mean Std.  
Variables used in Corruption Regressions 
CPI2001 Corruption Perceptions Index in 2001 
 
4.706 2.374 
Staterelcons A dummy variable equal to one if there is a  
state religion in the country’s constitution 
0.191 0.396 
Lawbenrel A dummy variable equal to one if the state has  
laws benefiting a certain religion (or religions) (see 
appendix for details) 
 
0.670 0.473 
Lawburdenrel A dummy variable equal to one if the state has  
laws effectively banning certain religions 
0.319 0.469 
Practbenrel A dummy variable equal to one if the state has  
practices benefiting a certain religion 
0.372 0.486 
Practburdenrel A dummy variable equal to one the state 
discriminates against or harasses a religious group 
 
0.287 0.455 
Registrationlaw A dummy variable equal to one if the state requires 
religions to register 
0.638 0.483 
Lesslawburden A dummy variable equal to one if the state imposes 
lesser legal burdens falling short of a ban 
 
0.234 0.426 
Discrimlawben A dummy variable equal to one if the state has laws 
providing special benefits to religious groups 
 
0.521 0.502 
Lesspracburden A dummy variable equal to one if the state has 
burdensome practices falling short of harassment 
 
0.106 0.310 
Commonlaw A dummy variable equal to one if the country  
has a common law legal system 
0.158 0.367 
Catholic Catholics as percent of the population 
 
37.527 39.289 
Muslim Muslims as percent of population 
 
15.399 30.602 
Socialist A dummy variable equal to one for socialist legal 
regime 
0.211 0.410 
Govconsump2000,  
Govconsump1999 
General government consumption as percent of  
GDP in year 2000, same in year 1990 
 
15.224, 
15.734 
5.364, 
5.630 
Illiteratemalerate Illiteracy rate among males above 16  
(average from 1996-2000) 
9.680 12.767 
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DemocPolity Polity IV Democracy index 1990 
 
5.853 4.005 
Democformal A dummy variable equal to one if the state is 
formally a democracy 
 
0.568 0.498 
Plurality Index measuring religious plurality 22.993 18.431 
Additional variables used in Growth Regressions 
MeanGDPCAPGR Average GDP per capita growth rate for  
1991-2000 
 
2.616 3.084 
GDP1990 GDP per capita in 1990 in prices of year 1995  
 
2.74e+11 8.84e+11 
GDPSQ GDP per capita in 1990 squared 
 
8.47e+23 5.07e+24 
Fertrate90 Fertility rate in 1990 
 
3.114 1.559 
Pop1990 Population in 1990 
 
4.90e+07 1.47e+08 
Lifeexp90 Life expectancy in 1990 
 
68.066 8.229 
Popgrowaver Average population growth 1991 – 2000 
 
1.293 1.142 
ExpimpGDP Exports plus imports divided by GDP,  
average 1991-2000 
35.432 26.477 
PopexpimpGDP Interaction term: Pop1990 multiplied  
by Expimpgdp 
 
1.37e+09 3.23e+09 
Investaver Average investment as % of GDP for 1991-2000 
 
22.611 5.189 
Primeduc1990 Enrollment in primary education in 1990 
 
98.184 14.051 
LatinAmerica Dummy variable for Latin America 
 
0.179 0.385 
Africa Dummy variable for Africa 0.198 0.401 
Urban2000 Percent of urban population in 2000 61.62 20.226 
Additional variables used in Inequality Regressions 
Gini Gini inequality coefficient 
 
38.455 10.517 
Consumpdum Dummy indicating Gini based on consumption  
data (rather than income data) 
 
0.412 0.495 
Time Time trend for survey years of Gini data 9.363 2.519 
 
Table 1a, continued 
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Notes to Table 1: 
1.The dependant variable is the 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, compiled by Transparency 
International (see www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/).  The index ranks countries in terms of the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians.  The index is based on 
surveys of business people, academics, and country analysts.  The index ranges from 10 (least corrupt) to 1 
(most corrupt) for 93 countries in our sample. 
2. DemocPolity: The democracy index runs from 0 to 10 and measures the degree to which the country’s 
political system approaches the ideal of one-man one-vote.  The variable is part of the data collected by the 
Polity IV Project, University of Maryland, see www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm (last visited 
4/21/04).  For a critical view of the index, see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004). 
3. Staterelcons: State religion specified in constitution in year 2001 (see appendix for more).  Our treatment 
of “state religion in constitution” represents the official position of the countries as opposed to the actual 
situation in the political and social sphere. A different approach is taken by Barrett, et al. (2001), who 
continue to classify some countries that abandoned an official state religion (examples in our sample 
include Italy, Portugal, Spain (Catholicism), and Sweden (Lutheranism)).  Some governments are classified 
as “officially religious” by Barrett et al., though not maintaining a single official state religion (such as 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Namibia, South Africa, and Switzerland in 
our sample).  Staterelcons, Lawbenrel, Lawburdenrel, Practbenrel, Practburdenrel, Registrationlaw, 
Lesspracburden, Lesslawburden, and Discrimlawben were all constructed using the Individual Country 
Reports released by the State Department in October 2001, and available at the University of Virginia 
Religious Freedom Institute (http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/nationprofiles). 
4. Lawbenrel: The laws of the country provide benefits to a religion (or religions) not provided to secular 
organizations; or some or all of the laws of the country are based on particular religious doctrine; or 
religious organizations or traditions are given specifically enumerated benefits in the constitution and other 
laws of the nation (see appendix for details).   
5. Lawburdenrel: (1) The laws specifically ban all or some religious groups.  (2) The discriminatory 
application of registration laws effectively bans certain religious groups.  See appendix for details. 
6.Practbenrel: National and municipal government officials treat religious groups better than comparable 
secular groups in ways not prescribed by law; OR membership in a particular religion imparts benefits not 
available to the general population (see appendix for details). 
7. Practburdenrel: The government discriminates against or harasses at least one religious group or 
supports discrimination and harassment by others. The country was not coded as practburdenrel if the 
group discriminated against was directly linked to acts of terrorism or other group-wide illegal activity (see 
appendix for details). 
8. Registrationlaw: The country has some system of registering religious groups (see appendix). 
9. Lesslawburden: The laws of the country restrict or impair religious exercise in ways that do not amount 
to an explicit or effective ban on a religious group; OR members of religious groups or their officials are 
subject to laws not imposed on secular organizations (see appendix). 
10. Discrimlawben: The government gives benefits to certain religious groups while excluding others (see 
appendix). 
11. Lesspracburden: (1) The government imposes burdens on religious groups in ways not prescribed by 
law and which fall short of explicit harassment. (2) There are long and cumbersome registration processes. 
12.Gini index: See  World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001.  Survey years range over the 
1990s.  In the case of Uruguay, the survey year was 1989.  For this reason, Uruguay was excluded from the 
sample for the inequality regression in Table 4.  Some of the Gini figures are based on income, and others 
based on consumption. 
13.Catholic and Muslim: source: Statistical Abstract of the World, 3d ed. Gale Research 1997, and World 
Christian Encyclopedia, 2d ed., David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johson, Volume 1, 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
10.Plurality index is equal to the sum of Catholic, Muslim, and 1-Catholic-Muslim, each quantity squared.  
It is similar to the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration. 
11.Socialist: source: LaPorta, et al. (1999). 
12.All other variables are from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002.  Investaver is 
the “gross fixed capital formation (as percent of GDP)” measure in the development indicators data.  It is 
the sum of public and private investment, and includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
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including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.  
Govconsump2000 and Govconsump1999 include all government current expenditures for purchases of 
goods and services (including compensation of employees); as well as most expenditures on national 
defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital 
formation. 
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Table 1b 
    Staterel~s       Lawben~l         Lawbur~l      Practben~l       Practbur~l      Commonlaw        Catholic 
Staterelcons    1.0000  
Lawbenrel    0.3414   1.0000   
Lawburdenrel    0.1888   0.1405   1.0000  
Practbenrel    0.1285   0.1658   0.1808   1.0000  
Practburdenrel    0.2288   0.0452   0.5741   0.2892   1.0000  
Commonlaw   -0.1276  -0.2786  -0.1582  -0.0750  -0.0014   1.0000  
Catholic   -0.1270   0.1325  -0.4703   0.0462  -0.4140  -0.1586   1.0000  
Muslim    0.3029   0.0785   0.4318   0.2788   0.5572  -0.1204  -0.4491   
Govconsump2000    0.1056   0.1719  -0.0449   0.0103  -0.0448   0.0209   0.0724 
Illiteratemalerate    0.2084  -0.0738   0.0353   0.1534   0.1948   0.0169  -0.1921  
GDP1990   -0.1216  -0.1767  -0.1514  -0.0554  -0.0728   0.1761  -0.0422  
Fertrate1990    0.1122  -0.1046   0.0456   0.0848   0.1944   0.0793  -0.1351  
Pop1990   -0.0882  -0.1032   0.2293   0.0820   0.2651   0.1056  -0.1703  
Lifeexp1990   -0.0084   0.0973  -0.1082  -0.0386  -0.1941  -0.0399   0.2382  
Popgrowaver    0.1382  -0.1274  -0.0138   0.0846   0.1906   0.1361  -0.0371  
ExpimpGDP   -0.1047  -0.0920  -0.0732   0.0210  -0.1168  -0.1330   0.0179  
Investaver   -0.1696   0.0582   0.3258  -0.0794   0.0352  -0.1622  -0.1869  
Urban2000   -0.0095   0.0087  -0.3152  -0.0006  -0.2386   0.0075   0.2646 
Socialist   -0.1869   0.0329   0.3132   0.0835   0.1296  -0.2236  -0.1154 
Registrationlaw   -0.0275   0.0842   0.0879  -0.0156   0.0375  -0.2448   0.0165 
Democformal   -0.2739   0.0596  -0.3274  -0.1168  -0.3573   0.0048   0.2611 
         Muslim          Govc~2000       Illiterate~e       GDP~90        Fertrat~1990      Pop1990        Life~1990 
Muslim    1.0000  
Govconsump2000   -0.1707   1.0000  
Illiteratemalerate    0.5295  -0.2416   1.0000  
GDP1990   -0.1297   0.0189  -0.1945   1.0000  
Fertrate1990    0.3872  -0.2725   0.7409  -0.2407   1.0000  
Pop1990    0.0111  -0.1029   0.1202   0.1982  -0.0400   1.0000  
Lifeexp1990   -0.3652   0.3352  -0.7339   0.2596  -0.8939  -0.0706   1.0000  
Popgrowaver    0.3420  -0.2768   0.6006  -0.1521   0.7843   0.0084  -0.5739  
ExpimpGDP    0.1950  -0.0825   0.2809  -0.0226   0.2021  -0.1188  -0.1737  
Investaver   -0.0214  -0.0676  -0.2417  -0.0021  -0.3441   0.2446   0.3089  
Urban2000   -0.3159   0.3436  -0.5349   0.2232  -0.6255  -0.2112   0.7362  
Socialist   -0.0444   0.1038  -0.3383  -0.1180  -0.3071   0.1043   0.1214  
Registrationlaw   -0.0052  -0.1985   0.0385  -0.1442   0.1723  -0.0454  -0.2375  
Democformal   -0.3637   0.0998  -0.2659   0.0586  -0.1140  -0.2893   0.0552 
       Popgrow~r      Expimp~P         Invest~r         Urban2000        Socialist          Regrist~w        Democf~l 
Popgrowaver    1.0000  
ExpimpGDP    0.1291   1.0000  
Investaver   -0.1611   0.0793   1.0000  
Urban2000   -0.3061  -0.0760   0.0590   1.0000  
Socialist   -0.5975  -0.0673   0.2716  -0.1232   1.0000 
Registrationlaw    0.0487  -0.0122   0.0966  -0.2111   0.2832   1.0000  
Democformal   -0.2141   0.0480  -0.1561   0.1257  -0.0506   0.0395   1.0000 
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Table 2a: Ordinary Least Squares Corruption Regressions 
 
Regressand: CPI2001  Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Staterelcons .236 
(0.50) 
.140 
(0.30) 
.501 
(1.04) 
.405 
(0.92) 
.446 
(1.14) 
 
Lawbenrel -.187 
(-0.35) 
-.034 
(-0.07) 
-.272 
(-0.50) 
-.367 
(-0.73) 
-.321 
(-0.68) 
 
Lawburdenrel -1.238*** 
(-2.41) 
-1.445*** 
(-3.10) 
-1.783*** 
(-3.66) 
-1.297*** 
(-2.70) 
-1.461*** 
(-3.40) 
 
Practbenrel -.116 
(-0.33) 
--- --- .056 
(0.17) 
--- 
      
Practburdenrel -.974** 
(-1.82) 
--- --- -.955** 
(-1.92) 
--- 
      
Plurality .002 
(0.22) 
.001 
(0.02) 
-.005 
(-0.48) 
.007 
(0.79) 
.005 
(0.57) 
      
Socialist -1.559*** 
(-3.09) 
-1.651*** 
(-3.48) 
--- -.624 
(-1.15) 
 
--- 
Illiteratemalerate -.064*** 
(-3.30) 
-.065*** 
(-3.44) 
-.038*** 
(-2.08) 
-.043*** 
(-2.27) 
-.030** 
(-1.88) 
 
Commonlaw .897** 
(1.72) 
.725 
(1.47) 
1.210*** 
(2.39) 
.435 
(0.86) 
.336 
(0.71) 
 
Catholic -.019*** 
(-3.56) 
-.018*** 
(-3.65) 
-.017*** 
(-3.33) 
-.015*** 
(-2.92) 
-.012*** 
(-2.55) 
 
Muslim .001 
(0.11) 
-.004 
(-0.52) 
-.006 
(-0.74) 
-.003 
(-0.39) 
-.008 
(-1.22) 
 
Registrationlaw .073 
(0.20) 
--- --- .145 
(0.42) 
 
--- 
Lesslawburden .247 
(0.45) 
--- --- .367 
(0.72) 
 
--- 
Discrimlawben .684 
(1.35) 
.496 
(1.03) 
.853*× 
(1.70) 
.489 
(1.03) 
.361 
(0.80) 
 
Lesspracburden -.110 
(-0.21) 
--- --- -.368 
(-0.74) 
 
--- 
Urban2000 .045*** 
(4.03) 
.044*** 
(4.08) 
.054*** 
(4.83) 
.037*** 
(3.44) 
.038*** 
(3.76) 
 
Govconsump2000 .108*** 
(3.66) 
.103*** 
(3.61) 
.080*** 
(2.70) 
.101*** 
(3.67) 
.084*** 
(3.29) 
 
Democformal -2.310*** 
(-2.54) 
-2.037*** 
(-2.43) 
-1.522** 
(-1.73) 
 
--- --- 
Democold --- --- --- -.634 
(-0.65) 
.231 
(0.32) 
Democnew --- --- --- -2.137*** 
(-2.52) 
-1.594*** 
(-2.36) 
Democlimit -2.518** 
(-1.78) 
-2.142 
(-1.58) 
-1.516 
(-1.05) 
-1.352**  
(-1.00) 
--- 
 32
Constant 4.240*** 
(3.42) 
4.138*** 
(3.48) 
2.843*** 
(2.36) 
3.640*** 
(3.11) 
2.958*** 
(2.84) 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.633 0.638 0.587 0.682 0.685 
 
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
N observations 93 93 93 93 93 
 
Notes to Table 2a: 1. *** for variables at 5% significance level, ** for those at 10% significance level. 
                              2. Dependent variable: CPI2001 (Corruption Perception Index for 2001). 
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Table 2b: Instrumental Variables Corruption Regressions 
Regressand: CPI2001 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3    
Staterelcons  
                                 
1.417*** 
(3.31) 
 
1.899*** 
(2.99) 
1.747*** 
(2.64) 
Lawbenrel -2.515*** 
(-2.51) 
-3.891*** 
(-2.43) 
-3.4*** 
(-2.09) 
Lawburdenrel -2.510*** 
(-2.93) 
-1.555 
(-0.87) 
-3.635*** 
(-3.50) 
Practbenrel -0.303 
(-0.62) 
-.669 
(-0.8) 
-.723 
(-0.79) 
Practburdenrel -1.162*** 
(-1.78) 
-2.495 
(-1.63) 
-1.12 
(-1.13) 
Democnew -1.72*** 
(-5.02) 
  
Democold  
 
1.591*** 
(4.07) 
1.507*** 
(3.56) 
Democlimit 0.848 
(0.81) 
.231 
(0.2) 
.585 
(0.48) 
Illiteratemalerate -.073*** 
(-6.23) 
-.074*** 
(-4.85) 
-.083*** 
(-4.94) 
Commonlaw .241 
(0.61) 
.496 
(0.87) 
.095 
(0.19) 
Catholic -.013*** 
(-1.91) 
-.01 
(-1.13) 
-.0179*** 
(-2.04) 
Muslim .009 
(1.31) 
.016 
(1.61) 
.015 
(1.28) 
Discrimlawben 2.141*** 
(2.52) 
3.068*** 
(2.41) 
3.02*** 
(2.29) 
Govconsump2000 .120*** 
(4.17) 
.132*** 
(3.51) 
.121*** 
(3.52) 
Constant 6.387*** 
(7.35) 
4.83*** 
(4.25) 
5.509*** 
(4.46) 
Centered R-squared 
Prob > F 
0.6026 
0.0000 
0.4486 
0.0000 
0.4496 
0.0000 
N observations 92 92 92 
                               
         Notes to Table 2b:  
1. *** for variables at 5% significance level, ** for those at 10% significance level, T-statistics in parentheses. 
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2. Regression 1 treats Practbenrel, Practburdenrel, Lawbenrel and Lawburdenrel as endogenous.  The 
instrument panel consists of: Plurality and various interactions: Catholic and Illiteracymalerate,  Muslim and 
Illiteracymalerate,  Pop90 and Plurality,  Pop90 and Illiteracymalerate, Lifeexp90 and Plurality, Lifeexp90 
and Catholic,  Lifeexp90 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and Catholic,  Urban2000 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and 
Plurality,  Urban2000 and Pop90,  Plurality and Illiteracymalerate, and triple interactions: Plurality and 
Illiteracymalerate and Pop90,  Plurality and Illiteracymalerate and Urban2000, Urban2000 and Catholic 
and Pop90, Urban2000 and Muslim and Pop90,  Catholic and Plurality and Illiteracymalerate,  Muslim and 
Plurality and Illiteracymalerate, Catholic and Plurality and Pop90,  Muslim and Plurality and Pop90. 
3. Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) for Reg. 1 = 18.701 (p-value = 0.346). 
4. Regression 2 treats Practbenrel, Practburdenrel, Lawbenrel and Lawburdenrel as endogenous.  The 
instrument panel consists of: Plurality and various interactions: Catholic and Illiteracymalerate,  Muslim and 
Illiteracymalerate,  Pop90 and Plurality,  Pop90 and Illiteracymalerate, Lifeexp90 and Plurality, Lifeexp90 
and Catholic,  Lifeexp90 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and Catholic,  Urban2000 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and 
Plurality,  Urban2000 and Pop90. 
5. Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) for Reg. 2 = 11.152 (p-value = 0.193). 
6. Regression 3 treats Practbenrel, Practburdenrel, Lawbenrel and Lawburdenrel as endogenous.  The 
instrument panel consists of: Plurality and Urban2000 and various interactions: Catholic and 
Illiteracymalerate,  Muslim and Illiteracymalerate,  Pop90 and Plurality,  Pop90 and Illiteracymalerate, 
Lifeexp90 and Plurality, Lifeexp90 and Catholic,  Lifeexp90 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and Catholic,  
Urban2000 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and Plurality,  Urban2000 and Pop90. 
7. Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) for Reg. 3 = 11.516 (p-value = 0.242). 
8. Regression 4 treats Practbenrel, Practburdenrel, Lawbenrel and Lawburdenrel as endogenous.  The 
instrument panel consists of: Plurality and various interactions: Catholic and Illiteracymalerate,  Muslim and 
Illiteracymalerate,  Pop90 and Plurality,  Pop90 and Illiteracymalerate, Lifeexp90 and Plurality, Lifeexp90 
and Catholic,  Lifeexp90 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and Catholic,  Urban2000 and Muslim,  Urban2000 and 
Plurality,  Urban2000 and Pop90. 
9. Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) for Reg. 4 = 10.536 (p-value = 0.229). 
10. We also ran a regression with legal origin variables instead of the common law variable and obtained similar 
results. 
11. Democold and Newdemoc are highly correlated for this subsample (92 observations) and one of them is 
automatically dropped by Stata. Results are unchanged if the corresponding variable is dropped manually. 
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Table 3: Growth Regressions 
 
Regressand: 
MeanGDPCAPGR Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg.6 
Staterelcons 
 
.217 
(0.29) 
.901 
(1.20) 
.442 
(0.61) 
.181 
(0.25) 
.406 
(0.58) 
 
Lawbenrel .268 
(0.42) 
.568 
(0.86) 
.149 
(0.24) 
.223 
(0.37) 
.293 
(0.51) 
.664 
(1.34) 
Lawburdenrel -1.377*** 
(-1.93) 
-1.584*** 
(-2.11) 
-1.057 
(-1.46) 
-1.430*** 
(-2.05) 
-1.698*** 
(-2.48) 
-1.640*** 
(-2.87) 
Practbenrel .431 
(0.80) 
.087 
(0.16) 
.499 
(0.92) 
.473 
(0.90) 
0.533 
(1.02) 
.502 
(1.02) 
Practburdenrel .785 
(1.07) 
.382 
(0.50) 
.778 
(1.07) 
.845 
(1.18) 
.578 
(0.84) 
 
Commonlaw 
 
.152 
(0.20) 
.678 
(0.85) 
.044 
(0.06) 
   
GDP1990 -1.35e-12 
(-1.16) 
-1.55e-13 
(-0.13) 
-1.02e-12 
(-0.87) 
-1.32e-12 
(-1.18) 
-1.15e-12 
(-1.22) 
-1.17e-12 
(-1.28) 
Pop1990 
 
8.96e-09*** 
(2.02) 
7.15e-09 
(1.54) 
1.00e-08*** 
(2.31) 
9.20e-09*** 
(2.13) 
4.51e-09*** 
(2.56) 
5.06e-09*** 
(3.01) 
Socialist -3.192*** 
(-2.90) 
 -2.176** 
(-1.84) 
-3.515*** 
(-3.62) 
-2.934*** 
(-4.36) 
-2.934*** 
(-5.01) 
DemocPolity   .160 
(1.47) 
   
Democformal -1.443 
(-1.28) 
-.771 
(-0.66) 
 -1.612 
(-1.54) 
-1.574 
(-1.54) 
-2.001*** 
(-2.13) 
Fertrate90 -.267 
(-0.47) 
-.519 
(-0.88) 
-.271 
(-0.48) 
   
Lifeexp90 .001 
(0.01) 
.032 
(0.34) 
.002 
(0.02) 
   
PopexpimpGDP -2.35e-10 
(-1.06) 
-1.42e-10 
(-0.61) 
-2.59e-10 
(-1.18) 
-2.61e-10 
(-1.22) 
  
GDPSQ 1.82e-25 
(0.96) 
-4.40e-27 
(-0.02) 
1.22e-25 
(0.65) 
1.81e-25 
(0.99) 
1.59e-25 
(0.99) 
 
Africa -.782 
(-0.72) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
-.001 
(-0.01) 
-1.244 
(-1.59) 
  
LatinAmerica 
 
-1.221 
(-1.35) 
-1.045 
(-1.10) 
-1.362 
(-1.52) 
-1.439** 
(-1.83) 
-.967 
(-1.43) 
-.862 
(-1.32) 
ExpimpGDP .009 
(0.83) 
.013 
(1.12) 
.007 
(0.69) 
.008 
(0.75) 
.002 
(0.20) 
 
Popgrowaver .242 
(0.45) 
1.252*** 
(2.90) 
.597 
(1.10) 
.007 
(0.02) 
  
Primeduc1990 .035  
(1.46) 
0.044** 
(1.79) 
.023  
(1.00) 
.039**   
(1.78) 
.041***   
(1.96) 
.032**   
(1.75) 
Govconsump1990 -.058       
 (-1.40) 
-0.083***    
(-1.96) 
-.089***     
 (-2.10) 
-.055     
 (-1.45) 
-.056    
  (-1.52) 
-.050   
   (-1.38) 
Investaver .080 
(1.35) 
0.036 
(0.60) 
.105** 
(1.75) 
.093** 
(1.68) 
.115*** 
(2.17) 
.093** 
(1.90) 
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    Note to Table 3: *** for variables at 5% significance level, ** for those at 10% significance level, T-statistics in parentheses.  
 
 
 
Constant -.587 
(-0.08) 
-4.667 
(-0.59) 
-2.783 
(-0.39) 
-1.349 
(-0.51) 
-2.435 
(-1.06) 
-.730 
(-0.38) 
N obs. 
Adj. R-squared 
87 
0.3047 
87 
0.2269 
87 
0.3102 
87 
0.3299 
87 
0.3166 
93 
0.3566 
Prob > F 0.0008 0.0070 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
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Table 4: Inequality Regressions 
Regressand: Gini Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 
Staterelcons -.742 
(-0.32) 
-0.845 
(-0.39) 
-1.419 
(-0.62) 
-.875 
(-0.38) 
-1.460 
(-0.65) 
 
Lawbenrel 1.073 
(0.54) 
1.033 
(0.53) 
1.451 
(0.74) 
.612 
(0.33) 
.483 
(0.27) 
 
Lawburdenrel 3.921** 
(1.76) 
3.936** 
(1.78) 
3.427 
(1.53) 
3.768** 
(1.71) 
3.556** 
(1.74) 
2.804** 
(1.64) 
Practbenrel -2.316 
(1.42) 
-2.272 
(-1.43) 
-2.378 
(-1.44) 
-2.245 
(-1.38) 
-1.871 
(-1.24) 
-1.938 
(-1.37) 
Practburdenrel -.026 
(-0.01) 
0.041 
(0.02) 
-.079 
(-0.04) 
.062 
(0.03) 
-.130 
(-0.06) 
 
Commonlaw 1.908 
(0.71) 
1.844 
(0.71) 
2.714 
(1.03) 
-.875 
(-0.38) 
  
GDP1990 4.84e-12 
(1.37) 
4.66e-12 
(1.43) 
4.37e-12 
(1.23) 
4.42e-12 
(1.28) 
1.02e-12 
(1.19) 
 
Pop1990 2.62e-08*** 
(1.97) 
2.64e-08*** 
(2.03) 
2.29e-08** 
(1.76) 
2.70e-08*** 
(2.05) 
2.10e-08** 
(1.78) 
 1.98e-08** 
(1.79) 
Socialist .446 
(0.13) 
 -.967 
(-0.27) 
.026 
(0.01) 
-.288 
(-0.10) 
 
DemocPolity   -.155 
(-0.42) 
   
Democformal 4.217 
(1.10) 
4.108 
(1.10) 
 4.864 
(1.31) 
4.337 
(1.23) 
5.324*** 
(1.64) 
Fertrate90 -.965 
(-0.50) 
-0.921 
(-0.49) 
-1.181 
(-0.62) 
-.612 
(-0.33) 
-.625 
(-0.35) 
-.525 
(-0.31) 
Lifeexp90 -.606*** 
(-2.17) 
-.611*** 
(-2.22) 
-.675*** 
(-2.43) 
-.558*** 
(-2.07) 
-.499*** 
(-2.02) 
-.439** 
(-1.89) 
PopexpimpGDP -1.64e-09*** 
(-2.48) 
-1.65e-09*** 
(-2.54) 
-1.59e-09*** 
(-2.39) 
  -1.62e-09*** 
(-2.47) 
-1.22e-09*** 
(-2.15) 
  -1.03e-09*** 
(-2.01) 
GDPSQ -6.17e-25 
(-1.08) 
-5.90e-25 
(-1.10) 
-5.31e-25 
(-0.93) 
-5.48e-25 
(-0.98) 
  
Africa 
 
1.677 
(0.49) 
1.577 
(0.48) 
.362 
(0.10) 
1.402 
(0.42) 
1.607 
(0.49) 
1.910 
(0.63) 
LatinAmerica 14.763*** 
(5.14) 
14.746*** 
(5.18) 
15.218*** 
(5.29) 
13.945*** 
(5.32) 
13.736*** 
(5.43) 
13.470*** 
(5.49) 
ExpimpGDP .032 
(0.97) 
.032 
(0.97) 
.037 
(1.09) 
.025 
(0.79) 
  
Popgrowaver 3.857*** 
(2.10) 
3.701*** 
(2.62) 
3.318** 
(1.77) 
3.778*** 
(2.07) 
3.620*** 
(2.15) 
3.592*** 
(2.72) 
Primeduc1990 .248*** 
(3.26) 
.247*** 
(3.29) 
.266*** 
(3.54) 
.243*** 
(3.22) 
.235*** 
(3.32) 
.234*** 
(3.54) 
Govconsump1990 -.001       
(-0.01) 
.003       
(0.03) 
.039       
(0.29) 
.004       
(0.03) 
  
Investaver 
 
.116 
(0.64) 
.122 
(0.71) 
.086 
(0.45) 
.106 
(0.59) 
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   Note to Table 4: *** for variables at 5% significance level, ** for those at 10% significance level, T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Constant 
 
41.823** 
(1.73) 
42.371** 
(1.79) 
51.374*** 
(2.27) 
38.674 
(1.63) 
40.109** 
(1.78) 
35.175** 
(1.65) 
N obs. 
Adj. R-squared 
77 
0.6672 
77 
0.6731 
77 
0.6610 
77 
0.6702 
77 
0.6801 
77 
0.6951 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix A: Definitions 
 
Definitions of Church-State Intervention Variables 
 
Staterelcons: State Religion(s) in the Constitution 
Definition 
• The constitution specifies that there is an official state religion. 
 
Examples 
• The constitution in Argentina specifies the Roman Catholic Church as the 
official state church. 
• Zambia’s constitution identifies that it is a Christian nation. 
 
Lawbenrel: Laws Benefiting Religion 
Definition 
• The laws of the country provide benefits to a religion (or religions) not provided 
to secular organizations; OR 
• Some or all of the laws of the country are based on particular religious doctrine; 
OR 
• Religious organizations or traditions are given specifically enumerated benefits in 
the constitution and other laws of the nation. 
 
Examples 
• In Austria the law provides subsides to recognized religions and supports church 
funded schools. 
• The law in Bangladesh allows that several Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and 
Christian holy days are national holidays. 
• Belarus has tax exemptions for religions by law. 
• The law requires or supports religious education in public schools in several 
countries including Bolivia, Croatia, and Jordan. 
• Islamic doctrine is the basis of many areas of law in Egypt. 
• The Roman Catholic Church is given special legal status in the laws and 
constitution of Guatemala.  
• In Morocco the government provides land grants to religious groups by law. 
• Norway has a constitutional requirement that the King and half of the parliament 
be Lutheran. 
 
Lawburdenrel: Laws Burdening Religion 
Definition 
• The laws specifically ban all or some religious groups. 
• The discriminatory application of registration laws effectively bans certain 
religious groups. 
 
Examples 
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• Uzbekistan has registration laws that require religious groups to have a legal 
address in order to register however; the government refuses to give certain 
groups legal addresses and denies their applications on this basis. 
• In Singapore the law bans the Jehovah’s Witnesses because their doctrine 
opposes military service. 
• Pakistan has laws prohibiting many aspects of the Ahmadi faith for example 
although Ahmadis see themselves as an offshoot of the Muslim faith, they can be 
criminally prosecuted for referring to themselves as such. 
 
Practbenrel: Practices Benefiting Religion 
Definition 
• National and municipal government officials treat religious groups better than 
comparable secular groups in ways not prescribed by law; OR 
• Membership in a particular religion imparts benefits not available to the general 
population. 
 
Examples 
• In Belarus the government shows a preference for religious groups in dispersing 
government funds. 
• Chinese officials grant preferential meeting places for certain religious groups. 
• In Cote D’Ivoire almost all of the higher ranking government officials are 
Catholic and there is a tradition of giving governmental gifts to Catholic clergy 
and leadership. 
• The state television channel in Croatia shows a substantial amount of Catholic 
programming. 
• Catholic officials in Nicaragua have substantial political power. 
• In Senegal the government provides funds and other assistance to citizens making 
a religious pilgrimage to Jerusalem or Mecca. 
 
Practburdenrel: Practices Burdening Religion 
Definition 
• The government discriminates against or harasses at least one religious group or 
supports discrimination and harassment by others. The country was not coded as 
practburdenrel if the group discriminated against was directly linked to acts of 
terrorism or other group-wide illegal activity. 
 
Examples 
• In Turkey there is widespread discrimination in many areas of government 
employment against members of groups thought to be fundamentalist.  
• Converting to any other religion from Islam can result in detention and 
questioning in Morocco and there is governmental discrimination against most 
non-traditional Muslim groups. 
• In Kazakhstan there are many reports of discrimination and harassment against 
non-registered faiths.  
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• The government in Ghana does not always respond to reports of religiously 
motivated violence. 
 
Registrationlaw: Religious Registration Laws 
Definition 
• The country has some system of registering religious groups. 
o This need not be a discriminatory system and in some cases it is merely a 
bureaucratic technicality. 
 
Examples 
• In Botswana there is a simple registration process but registration does not impart 
any specific benefits nor does a failure to register leave the group in a 
disadvantaged position. 
• Many groups have been turned down in Kazakhastan’s registration process and 
are consequently not allowed to operate as legal entities. 
 
Lesslawburden: Lesser Legal Burden 
Definition 
• The laws of the country restrict or impair religious exercise in ways that do not 
amount to an explicit or effective ban on a religious group; OR 
• Members of religious groups or their officials are subject to laws not imposed on 
secular organizations. 
 
Examples 
• In Vietnam there are restrictions on forms of religious hierarchy and the 
government maintains a veto power in nominating religious officials. 
• There are bans on wearing religious head coverings in schools and hospitals in 
Turkey. 
• In Tunisia there are legal bans on religious proselytizing.  
• Some religious materials are banned in Singapore. 
• The constitution in Panama prohibits clerics from participating in politics. 
 
Discrimlawben: Discriminatory Allocation of Legal Benefits 
Definition 
• The government gives benefits to certain religious groups while excluding others. 
 
Examples 
• In Austria benefits such as subsidies are only given to registered religious groups 
and the government does not allow all groups to be registered. 
• The government in Costa Rica only gives benefits such as tax exemptions and 
subsidies to the Roman Catholic Church. 
• Government supported religious education in schools and tax benefits are only 
given to the two state churches in Finland. 
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Lesspracburden: Lesser Practical Burden 
Definition 
• The government imposes burdens on religious groups in ways not prescribed by 
law and which fall short of explicit harassment. 
• There are long and cumbersome registration processes. 
 
Examples 
• The Ministry for Social Security and Generations in Austria issued an edition of 
a controversial brochure that described numerous non-recognized religious groups 
in negative terms 
• In Bangladesh missionaries are allowed to get visas but face large delays and are 
often refused. 
• The registration process in Estonia requires that leaders of religious organizations 
be citizens with at least 5 years' residence in the country and requires submission 
of the minutes of the constitutive meeting, a copy of statutes, and a notarized copy 
of three founders' signatures as supporting documents for the registration 
application. 
• In Norway Islamic groups have faced many bureaucratic obstacles trying to get 
permits to build mosques. 
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Appendix B: Data 
  Staterelcons Lawbenrel Lawburdenrel Practbenrel Practburdenrel 
Regis-
trationlaw 
Lesslaw-
burden 
Discrim-
lawben 
Lessprac- 
burden 
Argentina 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Azerbaijan 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Bangladesh 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Belarus 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Camaroon 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Canada 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
China 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Columbia 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Costa Rica 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Cote d’Ivoire 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Czech Rep.  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominican 
Rep.  0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
El Salvador 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Finland 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
France 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Germany 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Greece 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Guatemala 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Honduras 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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Iceland 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
India 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Indonesia  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Italy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Jamaica 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Jordan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. of 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Latvia 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Lithuania 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Malawi 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Malaysia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Mauritius 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Moldova 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Morocco  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Nigeria 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Norway 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Pakistan  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Panama 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Peru 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Philippines 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Poland 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Romania 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Russian Fed. 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Singapore 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Slovak Rep. 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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Slovenia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Sweden 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland  0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Taiwan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Tanzania 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Thailand 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Turkey 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
United Kingdom 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Venezuela 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Vietnam 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Zambia 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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